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THE INTEGRITY OF DEATH: RESOLVING 
DILEMMAS IN MEDICINE 
Larry I. Palmer 
The U.S. Supreme Court's declaration three years ago that 
there was no constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide1 
has not ended the public debate over, or media attention to, 
the so-called right to die. Proponents of the right to die have 
simply shifted the debate to the political arena, as evident in 
the recent ballot initiative in Maine seeking to establish by 
legislation the right of a terminally ill patient to a physician's 
help in dying. 
The Court's decision this past term declaring unconstitu-
tional a particular statute prohibiting so-called partial birth 
abortion2 will not end the political or moral debate over the 
"right to life." The controversy about the legal parameters for 
terminating pregnancy spills over into political rhetoric about 
the appropriate uses of reproductive technologies and the 
meaning of "family." The persistence of those acrimonious 
debates over the role of medicine raises this question: Should 
courts, the political process, or families control the intimate 
matters of who should live and who should die? 
Faith in medical progress has created the public dilemmas 
about both the beginning and the end of life. The collective 
search for meaning in our large and complex society fails to 
acknowledge the influence of several basic social institutions 
(family, religion, science, medicine, and law) in shaping in-
timate concepts of meaning. Too often people have turned 
to one of those institutions, law, and particularly to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, to provide guidance in their search for com-
munity. Science also appears to offer guidance. Belief in 
scientific progress and its alliance with medicine has raised 
the question of whether individuals-in collaboration with 
health care professionals in their service-should create life 
or control death. 
A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DIE 
As we consider whether there is a constitutional right to die, 
we must remember that a decade ago-before the debate 
began over a constitutional right to physician-assisted sui-
cide-the justices had already answered no in Cruzan v. Di-
rector, Missouri Department of Health. 3 The fact that even 
so-called conservative justices within the institutional con-
straints of the U.S. Supreme Court used different methods of 
reasoning to arrive at their respective nos indicates that judges 
Should courts, the political process, or 
families control the intimate matters of who 
should live and who should die? 
have different conceptions of the Court's role in institutional 
life. Those different conceptions are evident from the differ-
ent questions each raises about the relationship oflegal insti-
tutions to the institution of medicine. Underlying all the 
justices' questions is a fundamental assumption that legisla-
tures, as opposed to courts, are the primary forum for deter-
mining the degree of legal control there should be over 
modem medicine. 
Legislatures provide a process that adjudication cannot 
provide. The question about dying that legislatures at the state 
level have consistently addressed over the past twenty-
five years is whether a patient is terminaL Through court-
developed doctrine and legislative ratification, nearly every 
state has in place the legal means of removing or withhold-
ing medical treatment from terminal patients with few, if any, 
possible legal ramifications for physicians. During the past 
decade, however, Jack Kevorkian, with the assistance of the 
national media, has transformed the public question about 
the terminally ill by assisting in the death of many patients 
most of us would categorize as chronically ill. There is in fact 
no legal or legislative definition of "chronically ill," but 
Kevorkian's rhetoric has forced us to consider if legal 
definitions of "terminally ill" will suffice in a world in which 
most of us will die of chronic, as opposed to acute, illnesses. 
In contrast to medicine, law in general is slow in adapting 
to social, economic, and ethical changes. The decade-long 
battle by Michigan prosecutors to convict Kevorkian for his 
assistance in more than 130 deaths should remind us what 
"due process" of law means. Law is a rather clumsy process, 
constrained in our system by its reliance on the past, what 
lawyers call precedents, and some traditions, such as the 
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requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, before lay 
jurors are authorized to convict anyone of a crime. 
People like Kevorkian, with resources to acquire lawyers 
and gamer media attention, can take advantage of techni-
calities in the pure novelty of the issues they present. 
Kevorkian's ability to escape conviction until recently must 
be seen against the backdrop that application of criminal laws 
to modern physicians is already fraught with uncertainty. In 
dealing with the withdrawal or withholding of treatment, the 
legislature in Michigan and elsewhere has been vigilant in 
Legislatures, as opposed to courts, are 
the primary forum for determining the 
degree of legal control there should be over 
modern medicine. 
protecting physicians from legal liability. In others words, 
physicians run less risk of criminal conviction than most de-
fendants charged with homicide.4 
The institution of medicine has begun to play an impor-
tant part in our construct of death. It should come as no sur-
prise that lay jurors had difficulty convicting Kevorkian until 
prosecutors had new tools-new laws about assisted suicide, 
technological evidence such as the videotape of Kevorkian 
injecting a patient, more control over admissible evidence, 
and perhaps a shift in public attitudes after the defeat of the 
initiative to legalize physician-assisted suicide. In any event, 
convicting a physician, even a defrocked one, for his alleged 
acts of mercy, acts that symbolize the idea of medical and social 
progress, is a difficult task for a jury consisting of past and future 
patients. 
WHO WILL DECIDE? 
As we move into legislative debates about assisted suicide and 
adequate pain medication, we are reminded that law is itself 
a complex institution of courts, administrative bodies, com-
missions, and legislatures. We are now in a legislative era in 
which acrimony over "rights" in the abortion debate must be 
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replaced by a public discourse that respects our rich diversity. 
Although the religious conviction that life begins at concep-
tion quite properly did not prevail in the constitutional 
debate over abortion, that does not mean that the spiritual-
ethical and religious position on assisted suicide and eutha-
nasia-that suffering is a necessary part of human life-must 
be silenced in the legislative and regulatory debates on as-
sisting death. Religion as an institution plays too important a 
role in American life to be ignored in the public debate over 
suffering that proponents of physician-assisted suicide have 
forced on us. 
Proponents offer secular understandings of suffering that 
must compete with various religious understandings of suf-
fering in the legislative debates. Although in polls Ameri-
cans express favorable views towards legalizing some form of 
physician-assisted death, when they vote, they often vote 
against such proposals, as the 1998 Michigan vote overwhelm-
ingly indicates. While some legal scholars suggest that church 
groups' assistance in defeating proposals to legalize physician-
assisted suicide is somehow illegitimate or leads to voter irra-
tionality,5 the views of those scholars are grounded in a vision 
of law as solely court-developed constitutional doctrine. 
Within institutional analysis it is impossible to remove the 
influence of religious beliefs from voter behavior, because 
those beliefs are intimately tied to individual conceptions of 
family and community. 
When the proponents of physician-assisted suicide took 
their secular crusade to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court 
gave an institutional response: If physicians are to have legal 
immunity for death-assisting activities, legislatures rather than 
courts must grant that immunity. 
While the justices were divided on how they reasoned to 
that result, they posed these more-general questions for medi-
cine and those who seek to regulate health care profession-
als: Should we view physicians as relievers and managers of 
pain, as determined scientifically rather than existentially? 
Should we in our public debates reject the metaphor of"phy-
sicians as relievers of suffering," just as we rejected a previous 
generation's metaphor of physicians as the preservers of life 
and the fighters against death? A reliever-of-pain metaphor, 
as opposed to a reliever-of-suffering metaphor, encourages us 
to use all our institutional resources-science, medicine, law, 
family, and even religion-to assist those with the pain of 
chronic conditions or terminal illnesses to live and die welL 
The U.S. Supreme Court's opinions on assisted suicide 
affirmed the right of any state to legalize assisted suicide and 
thus retroactively affirmed the constitutionality of the Oregon 
Death with Dignity Act. The problem remains whether Or-
egon provides the appropriate direction for other states that 
might consider the question. Oregon should not be the model, 
once we understand that legislatures are the appropriate fo-
eligion as an institution plays too 
important a role in American life to be 
ignored in the public debate over suffering. 
rum, and the rules of engagement for legislative change are 
very different from the rights-oriented discussions of the past. 
Legislative change is a complex process, because medicine 
is already highly regulated by a combination of statutes, court 
decisions, and administrative regulations. Proponents of the 
Oregon approach will use a combination of personal tales of 
horrible deaths and data about the Oregon experience6 to 
argue for legislative change. My own prediction is that we will 
continue to agonize over the role of physicians in our dying 
but that few states will follow the Oregon example. There are 
many forces within the institution of medicine for limiting 
the widespread use of lethal doses of drugs even in Oregon, 
not the least of which is the question of whether pharmacists 
are willing or ethically bound to fill the prescriptions.7 
Furthermore, once we recognize that legislatures are the 
appropriate forum for exercising social control over medicine, 
it is apparent that the rights view of the relationship of medi-
cine to law is simplistic. For instance, to change the "law" in 
Michigan to allow physician-assisted death required voters 
to read and understand a 12,000-word document proposing 
many modifications of statutes rather than a simple yes or no 
vote on a slogan about rights. Michigan citizens voted against 
the changes, since their ramifications in relation to impor-
tant concepts of family and the integrity of death, as well as 
life, were unclear. 
LIFE AND DEATH 
That, finally, is the crux of the matter. The constitutional 
debate over physician-assisted suicide has illustrated that we 
cannot deal with death without talking about life. That de-
bate has also demonstrated the limitations of both law and 
medicine in providing us with the choices that lead to mean-
ingful lives and peaceful deaths. What we must seek from both 
institutions is a matrix that supports choice as well as respon-
sibility for individuals. 
l11ere are vast personal, social, and ethical issues involved 
in how we live and die. In a democratic and pluralistic soci-
ety, many questions will have to involve political processes, 
with all their limitations. Medicine and law are social systems 
within a dynamic, fluid community. Neither medicine nor law 
can provide meaningful lives or graceful deaths, but they can 
provide choices that affirm for individuals who they are. It is 
within that matrix of choice that both beginnings and end-
ings have value for each of us, as well as for our society. 
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